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Mr Holland was the director of a company set up to provide cheap holidays to the public by offering them the chance to holiday in unused timeshare accommodation. When promoting the scheme, the staff of the company made a number of statements about the company and the scheme to the effect that:
- the company was a large company;
- it was part of a global, American-based group;
- it was the subsidiary of a larger group and was responsible for the management of that group’s resorts;
- it had been established in the USA for 12 years and in the UK for two years;
- the company had approximately 3,000 members in the UK; and
- that members of the scheme’s money invested was placed in a trust fund, such that even if the company went out of business the money invested would be safe.
It transpired that these statements were false and Mr Holland, along with two co-directors, was prosecuted for a number of offences, including 13 offences contrary to s14(1)(a)(i) of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 of knowingly making false statements as to the provision in the course of a trade or business of any service. Prior to trial, one co-director disappeared and the other pleaded guilty to a number of the counts.
Mr Holland pleaded not guilty, but was convicted by a jury in the Crown Court.
Mr Holland appealed this conviction on two grounds. First, that the statements complained of were not statements relating to ‘the provision of a service’. Secondly, he argued that the indictment contained too many counts.
The Court of Appeal rejected his renewed application for permission to appeal. On the first ground, it followed the decision in R v Breeze, where it was found that the adoption of a personal qualification that a person did not enjoy was an offence under s14(1)(a)(i), in that an architect who described himself as fully qualified when he was only in fact partly trained was guilty of making a statement which he knew to be false as to the provision in the course of a trade or business of any services. In the current case, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge and found that there was no distinction between the nature of services to be performed and the identity or the qualification of the person providing that service. The company had not merely stated that holidays would be provided, but had held itself out as an organisation that the public could trust and invest its money in. The point being put forward was identical to that decided in Breeze, and the appeal did not even raise an arguable point for which leave to appeal should be granted.
The Court of Appeal also rejected the second ground of appeal. The matter had been raised and discussed with the trial judge who, while also stating a preference for the number of counts on the indictment to be reduced, had not thought the number too many to confuse a jury. The Court of Appeal thought this a matter for the trial judge, who had given a suitable direction to the jury in relation to the number of counts, and noted that the fact that the jury acquitted on some counts but not others was prima facie evidence that it had the capacity to discriminate between the different offences alleged.
The renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction was therefore dismissed.
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